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This paper examines the main justifications for recognising Kosovo’s independence: 
‘remedial secession’ and ‘earned sovereignty’. Our paper begins by examining the 
applicability of the doctrine of remedial secession to Kosovo, the justifications for which 
can be seen clearly in the decade from 1989 to 1999. However, we argue that the 
doctrine of remedial secession was insufficiently ripe, in political and legal terms, to be 
used in 1999 to support Kosovo’s independence. An opposing approach is that of ‘earned 
sovereignty’ which aims to provide for the managed devolution of sovereign authority 
and functions from a state to a sub-state entity, resulting either in independence or 
rehabilitated autonomy within the host state. Based on the case of Kosovo, we propose 
an alternative explanation to this observed path towards ‘recognisable’ statehood: 
‘remedial sovereignty’ whereby a people realise statehood by invoking remedial secession 
and undergoing a transitional period of mediated international administration, 
characterized by elements of sovereignty which are externally designed and internally 
earned. Therefore, we propose ‘remedial sovereignty’ as a useful paradigm to provide the 
international community with a framework to confer statehood on those peoples for 
whom there is no other choice, thereby resolving the ‘recognition dilemma’ experienced 
in the aftermath of the Kosovo’s declaration of independence. 
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Recognizing Kosovo’s independence:  Remedial secession or earned 
sovereignty? 
I. Introduction 
Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 17 February 2008 met a divided international 
response. While seventy UN member states have recognised Kosovo’s independence 
(including 22 EU states), other states continue to withhold recognition. Most significantly, 
Russia and China refuse to recognize Kosovo as an independent state and supported 
Serbia’s initiative to request an Advisory Opinion from the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) on the ‘Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo’.1 The ICJ 
announced its Advisory Opinion on 22 July 2010, concluding that  
‘the adoption of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate 
general international law, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) or the Constitutional 
Framework. Consequently the adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable 
rule of international law.2 
Indeed, the ICJ Advisory Opinion responded in this restrictive manner to the ‘narrow and 
specific’ question posed. It deliberately avoided pronouncing on ‘the validity or legal effects 
of the recognition of Kosovo’3 by UN Member States and did not examine systematically 
the justifications put forward by states that recognize Kosovo. Accordingly, this paper aims 
to analyze and evaluate the legal and political grounds invoked by states which recognize 
Kosovo as an independent state.  
States that support and recognize Kosovo’s independence justify their recognition with 
regard to a number of factors, including: human rights abuses under Milošević; a decade of 
international administration; Kosovo’s statehood capacity; the exhaustion of future status 
negotiations; and Kosovo’s commitment to respect minority rights and accept ‘supervised 
independence’. Furthermore, most countries emphasize that Kosovo’s independence is the 
only way to promote regional peace and stability and describe Kosovo as a sui generis case, 
which does not constitute a precedent for other cases. By contrast, states that withhold 
recognition support Serbia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and argue that 
international law does not allow secession outside the colonial context and that ‘unilateral 
secession’ – secession in the absence of host state consent -  should not have effect and 
sets a negative precedent.  
Legal doctrine holds that ‘secession is neither legal nor illegal in international law, but a 
legally neutral act the consequences of which are regulated internationally’.4 Accordingly, 
                                                            
1 UN General Assembly, Resolution  63/3, 5, UN Doc. A/RES/63/3, (8 October 2008).  
2 I.C.J., ‘Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo’, Advisory Opinion, 22 July 2010, para. 122. 
3 ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, para. 51. 
4 James Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, 2nd ed., OUP, Oxford, 2006,p.390  
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the decision to bestow or withhold recognition has legal and political consequences in the 
international and domestic spheres. Internationally, recognition opens the path for 
membership of international organizations and participation in global economic, political and 
security structures. For post-conflict situations such as Kosovo, such international 
participation is vital for political stability and economic development. Regionally, the 
resolution of contested borders promotes stability and integration. Indeed, Kosovo’s 
Deputy Prime Minister Hajredin Kuçi commented: ‘The recognition of Kosovo is as 
important as the declaration of independence. This is a crucial issue for the new state of 
Kosovo and its functioning.’5 
In view of the political and legal significance of recognition, and the controversy 
surrounding the recognition of Kosovo’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence, this paper 
examines the justifications put forward by states that recognize Kosovo’s independence. To 
contextualize this endeavour, we examine two theoretical approaches that suggest 
procedures for regulating the recognition of contested territories and sovereignty-based 
disputes: remedial secession and earned sovereignty. ‘Remedial secession’ is a scheme by 
which, corresponding to the varying degrees of oppression inflicted upon a particular group 
by its governing State, international law may recognize a continuum of remedies ranging 
from the protection of individual rights, to minority rights ending with secession as the 
ultimate remedy.6 While remedial secession considers the genesis of conflicts and focuses 
on the implications of host state oppression which may necessitate international 
intervention, earned sovereignty ‘entails the conditional and progressive devolution of 
sovereign powers and authority from a state to a sub-state entity under international 
supervision.’7 Both of these approaches have been formulated to serve different functions: 
first as a description of state practice, second as an explanation for particular cases, and 
finally as a prescription for other, similar contexts.  
This paper considers the explanatory power of these two doctrines in relation to the 
recognition of Kosovo, by analyzing the extent to which these approaches reflect the 
international response to Kosovo over twenty years, with a particular focus on analyzing 
the statements recognizing the 2008 Declaration of Independence. Based on our analysis 
of the Kosovo case, we develop a new theory, ‘remedial sovereignty’ which synthesizes the 
two approaches to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the conditions under 
which an oppressed people claiming self-determination can ‘earn’ their sovereignty under 
international supervision and acquire international recognition, despite the constraints of 
international politics and the limits of international law.  
II. Remedial secession 
The theoretical basis for ‘remedial secession’ is located in international law and normative 
theory, reflecting the increased salience of human rights considerations during state 
                                                            
5 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article3392492.ece  
6 Lee Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination, YUP, New Haven, Connecticut, 1978, p.222 
7 Williams, P. R., & Pecci, F. J., ‘Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-
Determination’, Stanford Journal of International Law, Vol. 40, No. 1, 2004, p. 4.  
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creation. This was formulated initially as the negative duty to apply collective non-
recognition to states created in violation of jus cogens (compelling law) by ethnic cleansing 
(a crime against humanity) and the UN Charter prohibition on territorial aggrandizement by 
use of force. Accordingly, collective non-recognition serves as a veto against states 
created by the violators of human rights. If this concept is inverted, can the international 
community recognize states created as a remedy of last resort to end ‘persistent and 
serious violations of human rights’ by allowing an oppressed people to secede from an 
abusive host state? This question is addressed by the remedial position.  
A number of legal scholars explicitly discuss the doctrine of remedial secession8, often 
described more technically as ‘a qualified right to unilateral secession’, the legal basis for which 
stems from the enshrinement of the right of self-determination. The 1970 Declaration on 
Friendly Relations addresses, inter alia, self-determination and proponents of the remedial 
secession doctrine claim that an inverted reading of the ‘safeguard clause’ of Principle V gives 
rise to the doctrine. According to this inverted reading, a state which does not conduct itself ‘in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’ and is not 
‘possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction’ is not protected by the safeguard clause and may be exposed to actions which, in 
the name of the principle of self-determination may dismember or impair, totally or in part, its 
territorial integrity or political unity’.9 Based on an analysis of the 1970 travaux preparatoires, 
Cassese argues that the Declaration on Friendly Relations ‘links external self-determination to 
internal self-determination in exceptional circumstances’.10  
Following the end of the Cold War, the remedial secession doctrine attracted increased 
consideration in judicial decisions, including Katanga, Loizidou v. Turkey and Quebec. 
Significantly, Serbia’s initial written contribution to the ICJ Kosovo Advisory Opinion 
denounced the doctrine.11 A significant number of states addressed remedial secession in 
their ICJ written and oral pleadings. Indeed, the counsel for the UK reminded the court that: 
Remedial self-determination was left open by the Canadian Supreme Court which did not 
need to decide it, given the advanced position of Quebec within Canada. But you would 
need to decide it before you could answer the question in the negative, against Kosovo. I 
stress that Quebec has never had its distinct status negated and then constitutionally 
denied, nor two thirds of its people chased violently from their homes and lands. 
When the ICJ announced its Advisory Opinion, it acknowledged that a number of participants 
raised the remedial secession doctrine, in ‘every instance only as a secondary argument’ 
                                                            
8 See David Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, Brill, Leiden, 2002; Buchheit, Secession: The 
Legitimacy of Self-Determination, YUP, New Haven, Connecticut, 1978; Marc Weller, Contested Statehood: 
Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence, OUP, Oxford, 2008. 
9 Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International law in the past third of a century’, Recueil des cours, Vol.159, 
No.1, 1978, p.110. 
10 Antonio Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples: A Legal Appraisal, CUP, Cambridge, 1995.  
11 In their written comments to the ICJ, Finland, Ireland, Poland and the UK referred to remedial secession 
explicitly. Serbia, Argentina, Cyprus, Spain, Iran, Romania, Russia, Slovakia came out against the doctrine. Texts 
available on ICJ website: http://www.icj-cij.org  
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describing it as a subject on which ‘radically different views were expressed’. The Opinion also 
acknowledged that certain participants questioned whether ‘the circumstances which some 
participants maintained would give rise to a right of “remedial secession” were actually 
present in Kosovo.’12 Nonetheless, the Court concluded that it was not ‘necessary to resolve 
these questions in the present case’ and emphasized that remedial secession was ‘beyond the 
scope of the question posed by the General Assembly.’ 13 
Following an analysis of potential state practice of remedial secession, Jure Vidmar 
investigated the application of the doctrine in Bangladesh, the Baltic Republics and Kosovo. 
He suggests that remedial secession has the following function in international law: although 
not a legal entitlement, remedial secession confers political and normative legitimacy on 
oppressed secessionist groups and may encourage states to recognise their independence.14 
Parallel to the growing consideration of remedial secession in legal doctrine, normative 
theories of secession are a product of the post-Cold War era, and were undoubtedly 
shaped by that era. Allen Buchanan launched the contemporary debate about the morality 
of secession in 1991 but his initial theories were superseded by his 2004 magnum opus 
entitled ‘Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International 
Law’, where he proposes a justice-based re-organization of international law, incorporating 
a ‘just cause’ theory of secession as a ‘remedial right only’.15 Buchanan identifies three 
forms of injustice that give rise to the remedial right to secede: 1) large-scale and 
persistent violations of basic individual human rights; 2) unjust annexation of a legitimate 
state’s territory or 3) the state’s persistent violations of intrastate autonomy 
agreements.16  
It is useful to analyze these criteria of remedial secession according to a re-formulation of 
the just war principles, an innovative approach first formulated by Bruno Coppieters.17 It is 
submitted that the following re-interpretation of Coppieters principles makes his framework 
more effective for the analysis of secessionist claims. First, the principle of just cause holds 
that unilateral secession must be a necessary means of redressing grave injustices, including 
violations of human rights, autonomy agreements or unjust annexation. Respect for the 
principle of last resort means that autonomy arrangements and negotiations should be 
exhausted. The principle of legitimate authority requires the seceding state to affirm its 
representative nature, adherence to the rule of law and to the principles of human rights. The 
principle of right intentions prescribes that the primary intention of unilateral secession 
should be a good faith attempt to redress a severe injustice. According to the principle of 
                                                            
12ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, para. 82. 
13ICJ Advisory Opinion on Kosovo, para. 83. 
14 Jure Vidmar, ‘Remedial Secession in International Law: Theory and (Lack of) Practice’, St. Antony’s 
International Review, Vol. 6, Number 1, 2010, p.43. 
15 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law, OUP, 
Oxford, 2004, Chapter 8. 
16 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination..., p.351-353 
17 Bruno Coppieters & Richard Sakwa, eds. Contextualizing Secession: Normative Studies in Comparative 
Perspective, OUP, Oxford, 2003, p.192 
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proportionality, the total cost of unilateral secession should correspond with the expected 
benefits. Finally, the chance of success principle obliges states to assess the extent to which 
they can expect international recognition, a major contributing factor in this instance can be 
the support of a powerful ally. Synthesizing these proposals, the following conditions can be 
identified as conditions that facilitate (or block) ‘remedial secession’: a) violations of 
autonomy agreements by the host state; b) unjust annexation of territory; c) human rights 
abuses perpetrated by the host state; d) international intervention to mediate a status 
outcome; e) support of powerful countries; f) exhaustion of negotiations; g) a commitment 
from the seceding entity to uphold minority rights. 
III. Earned sovereignty 
The concept of earned sovereignty was initially developed as a policy prescription and 
conflict resolution strategy for Kosovo in November 1998 by the Public International Law 
and Policy Group (PILPG) and the International Crisis Group (ICG). Reflecting the remedial 
position, their 1998 memorandum reasoned that Kosovars were entitled to heightened 
sovereignty because of past abuses by the Serbian Regime, but were ‘required to earn full 
sovereignty at the end of an interim period by demonstrating their commitment to 
democratic self-government, to the protection of human rights, and the promotion of 
regional security.’18 Accordingly, they recommended that the international community 
should intervene and oversee a three-to-five-year period of transition.19 During this 
transitional period, the memorandum envisaged that the people of Kosovo should assume 
increasing levels of sovereign authority and functions from Serbia, subject to minority 
rights compliance and respect for the territorial status quo.20 Thereafter, Kosovo’s status 
should be determined by a referendum.21 This initial approach was described as 
‘intermediate sovereignty’, but was referred to subsequently as phased recognition, 
provisional statehood, conditional independence, supervised independence. Since these 
positions converge around the ‘earned sovereignty’, that term will be used in this paper.22 
Williams et al hold that this approach informed the Rambouillet Peace Accords and UN 
Security Council Resolution 1244.23 Thereafter, the earned sovereignty approach was 
further developed by a number of expert commissions and think tanks, including the 
International Independent Commission for Kosovo (the Goldstone Commission).24 Earned 
Sovereignty arguably influenced the UN doctrine of ‘standards before status’ and Ahtisaari’s 
                                                            
18 Paul R. Williams, ‘Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolve the Conflict over Kosovo’s Final Status’, Denver 
Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 31, 2002, p. 400 
19 Williams, P. R, ‘Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolve the Conflict over Kosovo’s Final Status’, p. 398.    
20 ICG, Intermediate Sovereignty as a Basis for Resolving the Kosovo Crisis, International Crisis Group Balkans 
Report no. 46, 09 November 1998.    
21 Williams, P. R, ‘Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolve the Conflict over Kosovo’s Final Status’, p. 398. 
22 Ibid, p. 391 
23 Ibid, p. 389-390   
24 IICK, The follow-up of the Kosovo Report: Why conditional independence?, Independent International 
Commission on Kosovo, 2001.  
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2007 status recommendation of ‘supervised independence’ for Kosovo.25 While the 
approach was refined in response to developments in Kosovo, seven contemporaneous 
‘sovereignty conflicts’ also drew on elements of earned sovereignty to resolve their 
disputes.26 In recognition of this, the PILPG published several academic papers in 2003 to 
facilitate the application of the earned sovereignty to other contexts and conflicts.  
This generalized ‘earned sovereignty’ approach is defined by three core elements: shared 
sovereignty, institution building, and a determination of final status.27 The first element, 
shared sovereignty, is characterized by the shared exercise sovereign authority and 
functions over a defined territory, by a sub-state entity and the host state or international 
community.28 The underlying logic is that shared sovereignty provides a ‘cooling-off period’ 
during which violence is suspended and both the central authorities and aggrieved peoples 
postpone the consideration of a final status by focusing on short-term goals such as public 
services and rebuilding institutions. Thus, the second element, institution building, involves 
the establishment of political and economic infrastructure and the strengthening or 
construction of institutions for self-government.29 These institutions are often constructed 
with the assistance of the international community.30 Once institution-building is 
sufficiently advanced, a third element, the determination of final status is initiated, often 
under international community mediation, with options ranging from substantial autonomy 
to full independence. 31 
Acknowledging the historical diversity of different conflicts and the need to provide 
flexibility in dealing with the political fragilities of peace processes Williams et. al. proposed 
three additional ‘optional’ elements: phased sovereignty, conditional sovereignty, and 
constrained sovereignty.32 Phased sovereignty involves the measured devolution of 
sovereign functions and authority from the parent state (or international community) to 
the sub-state entity during the period of shared sovereignty and prior to the determination 
of final status. 33 The timing and extent of the devolution of authority and functions may be 
correlated with the development of institutional capability or made conditional on the 
                                                            
25 UNMIK, Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan, Prishtina, 31 March 2004; Letter dated 7 October from 
Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2005/635, 30 November 
2004, p.7.  
26 The nine territories in question were Northern Ireland, Serbia and Montenegro, East Timor, Bougainville, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Sudan, Israel/Palestine and Western Sahara. For an overview see: Paul R. 
Williams, Michael P. Scharf, & James R. Hooper, ‘Resolving Sovereignty-based Conflicts: The Emerging 
Approach of Earned Sovereignty’, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol. 31, 2002, pp. 349-387. 
27 Williams, P. R., & Pecci, F. J., ‘Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-
Determination’, p. 4. 
28 James R. Hooper, & Paul R. Williams, ‘Earned Sovereignty: The Political Dimension’, Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy, Vol. 31, 2002-03, pp. 355-372. 
29 The Public International Law & Policy Group (PILPG) 
http://www.publicinternationallaw.org/areas/peacebuilding/earnedsov/index.html. 
30 Hooper, J. R., Williams, P. R., ‘Earned Sovereignty: The Political Dimension’, p. 363. 
31 Ibid, p. 365. 
32 Williams, P. R., & Pecci, F. J., ‘Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-
Determination’, p. 4.  
33 Paul R. Williams & James R. Hooper, ‘Earned Sovereignty: The Political Dimension’, Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy, Vol. 31, 2002, p.366. 
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fulfilment of certain conditions such as democratic reform and the protection of human 
rights.34 This benchmarks identified during conditional sovereignty vary depending on the 
characteristics of the conflict and generally include conditions, such as protecting human 
and minority rights, developing democratic institutions, strengthening rule of law and 
promoting regional stability. 35 Once the final status has been determined, constrained 
sovereignty applies limitations on the sovereign authority and functions of the new state, 
such as continued international administration and/or military presence, and limits on the 
right of the state to undertake territorial association with other states.36 Williams et al 
argue that the core and optional elements of earned sovereignty should be adopted by 
mutual consent. However, they acknowledge that, in some cases, the international 
community may impose these elements against the will of the host state or sub-state 
entity, as illustrated by Kosovo.37 
IV. Decennial theories and developments in Kosovo 1989-2009 
Both remedial secession and earned sovereignty address different decades of the Kosovo 
case. The conditions of remedial secession can be identified between 1989 and 1999, 
when Serbia substantively abolished Kosovo’s autonomy and subjected Kosovo-Albanians 
to a systematic denial of their basic human rights, including general discrimination, mass 
dismissal of ethnic Albanians from public office and commercial enterprises, interference 
with the judiciary, arbitrary arrests and imprisonment, torture and mistreatment and 
disproportionate use of force.38 Following seven years of passive resistance, the Kosovo-
Albanians radicalised around their grievances and began to support the Kosovo Liberation 
Army (KLA). This in turn exacerbated a ‘dynamic of violence’ that created a humanitarian 
emergency by 1998 as Serbian state-sponsored violence took on the form of ethnic 
cleansing. In response to these developments, NATO intervened and UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244 placed Kosovo under international administration, effectively removing 
Serbia’s sovereignty over Kosovo.  
As outlined above, earned sovereignty was promulgated with reference to these events, 
initially as a policy prescription in 1998, and then reflected in the approach taken by the 
Rambouillet Accords and Resolution 1244. Accordingly, the elements of earned sovereignty 
provide useful reference points for examining Kosovo’s ongoing decade of international 
administration from 1999. During this time, institutions of self-government were 
consolidated for Kosovo’s ‘future status’ - be that wide autonomy within Serbia, or 
independent statehood. Upon the exhaustion of extensive UN-sponsored negotiations, 
Kosovo declared its independence in 2008. Countries that support Kosovo’s independence 
justify their recognition with reference to the above events, which reflect elements of the 
                                                            
34 Ibid, p. 366. 
35 Williams, P. R., & Pecci, F. J., ‘Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-
Determination’, p. 9-10. 
36 Williams, P. R., & Hooper J. R., ‘Earned Sovereignty: The Political Dimension’, p. 370. 
37 Williams, P. R., & Pecci, F. J., ‘Earned Sovereignty: Bridging the Gap between Sovereignty and Self-
Determination’, p. 10. 
38 Marc Weller, Contested Statehood: Kosovo’s Struggle for Independence, OUP, Oxford, 2008, p.60-4. 
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remedial secession and earned sovereignty approaches. The following section examines 
each development in turn from the perspective of the relevant doctrine. A subsequent 
section considers the extent to which these doctrines were invoked in the recognition 
statements of countries that recognize Kosovo.  
4.1 Abolition of autonomy  
The abolition of autonomy is one of the key remedial conditions identified by Buchanan39 
and carries legal significance as the right to (internal) self-determination is considered a 
right jus cogens. Furthermore, the safeguard clause indicates that the denial of internal 
self-determination may convert into an external right of self-determination.40 Although 
earned sovereignty does not address violations of autonomy agreements and human rights 
abuses, these conditions constitute the root of the problem that earned sovereignty aims 
to resolve. According to the normative shift from ‘sovereignty as authority over territory’ 
to ‘sovereignty as responsibility’,41 we suggest that these conditions are significant as they 
weaken the sovereign legitimacy of the host state, thereby providing the sub-state entity 
with a reasonable justification to ‘earn’ its sovereignty.  
Kosovo presents a clear case of the abolition of autonomy, particularly in view of Kosovo’s 
extensive autonomy, amounting to quasi-republican status under the 1974 Constitution of 
Yugoslavia. The gradual centralization of power in Belgrade from 1988-1990 introduced 
constitutional amendments to reduce the competencies of the Kosovo Assembly and 
Belgrade finally abolished the Assembly in July 1990, thereby removing ‘the last vestiges of 
Kosovo’s autonomous status.’42 However, the significance of the violation of autonomy 
agreements is unclear. During the 1990s, UN General Assembly resolutions repeated 
demands for the restoration of Kosovo’s autonomy, but politicians were unwilling to raise 
the issue at international conferences on Yugoslavia in 1991, 1992 and 1995, due to 
Serbia’s insistence that Kosovo was an ‘internal’ matter.43 However, in 1999 Clinton 
justified the NATO intervention by explaining that:  
In 1989 Serbia's leader Slobodan Milošević... stripped Kosovo of the constitutional 
autonomy its people enjoyed, thus denying them their right to speak their language, run 
their schools, shape their daily lives. For years, Kosovar's struggled peacefully to get their 
rights back. When President Milošević sent his troops and police to crush them, the struggle 
grew violent... 
Similarly, the UN Secretary-General the violation of Kosovo’s autonomy as constituting the 
‘root cause of the crisis’: 
Before there was a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo, there was a human rights 
catastrophe. Before there was a human rights catastrophe, there was a political 
                                                            
39 Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination...p.351-353. 
40 Cassese, Self-determination of Peoples: A Legal Appraisal, CUP, Cambridge, 1995.  
41 Jennifer Welsh, ed., Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations, OUP, Oxford, 2006, p.2. 
42 Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: A Short History, OUP, Oxford, 2002, p.246. 
43 Richard Caplan, Europe & the Recognition of New States in Yugoslavia, CUP, Cambridge, 2005, p. 140.  
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catastrophe: the deliberate, systematic and violent disenfranchisement of the Kosovar 
Albanian people.44 
 
During the Security Council debate on Kosovo in February 2008, Panama emphasised that 
‘Kosovo enjoyed an autonomy very much like the autonomy of the old republics of greater 
Yugoslavia, and an attempt was made to deprive it of that autonomy’.45  Significantly, the 
abolition of autonomy was not explicitly mentioned in the recognition statements, but the 
issue was touched upon with reference to the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the right of 
self-determination. 
4.2 Human rights abuses 
David Raic rightly identifies human rights abuses as the ‘catalytic agent’ for the remedial 
secession, but the challenge is to identify appropriate thresholds.46 By contrast, earned 
sovereignty articulates a conflict resolution mechanism once human rights violations have 
been committed, rather than incorporating causal factors.  Following the abolition of 
Kosovo’s autonomy, a number of discriminatory laws were introduced against the Albanians 
in Kosovo, constituting a ‘persistent and serious’ violation of their human rights.  Beginning 
in 1989, new laws prohibited Albanians from the unauthorized sale of private property and 
restricted Albanian-language education.47 During the 1990s, international monitoring 
bodies such as the CSCE and the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights chronicled the 
discrimination suffered by Kosovo-Albanians. These reports ‘filtered up’ through the 
Commission on Human Rights, the Third (Humanitarian) Committee of the United Nations 
General Assembly, to the agenda of the General Assembly plenary sessions.48 Accordingly, 
the UN General Assembly adopted twelve resolutions between 1992 and 1998, 
summarizing the findings of the monitoring mechanisms and condemning FRY/Serbian 
abuses of human rights in Kosovo. A frequently-repeated operative clause condemned: 
 
‘...the large-scale repression by the police and military of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
against the defenceless ethnic Albanian population and the discrimination against the ethnic 
Albanians in the administrative and judiciary branches of government, education, health care 
and employment, aimed at forcing ethnic Albanians to leave.’49 
 
The CSCE mission chronicled the Albanian passive resistance movement and the 
establishment of parallel administrative structures, including parallel economy.50 
Significantly for remedial secession, there was little international support for Kosovo’s 
independence at this point. In December 1992, the EC declared that ‘the autonomy of 
Kosovo within Serbia must be restored.’51 Despite the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy and 
                                                            
44 Secretary-General Addresses High-Level Meeting on Balkans SG/SM/6992, 14 May 1999. 
45 UNSC Meeting-Record, S/PV.5839, 18 February 2008, p.21, Panama. 
46 David Raic, Statehood and the Law of Self-Determination, p.372. 
47 Marc Weller, The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999, International Documents and Analysis, Vol. I, Documents and 
Analysis Publishing Ltd, Cambridge,1999, p.62-63 
48 Weller, Contested Statehood, p.57. 
49 UNGA Resolution - Situation of Human Rights in Kosovo, (A/RES/49/204 – 13 March 1995), 49/204. 
50 CSCE Mission to Kosovo, Report on Kosovo Stalemate, 16 November 1992. 
51 Statement of Edinburgh European Council meeting, 12 December 1992.  
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international reports of grave, widespread and persistent abuses of human rights in Kosovo, 
international action was limited to human rights advocacy, implying that the remedial 
conditions were not taken into consideration at this point.   
However, the escalation of violence in 1997-9 transformed the Kosovo issue ‘from a 
human rights problem into a humanitarian crisis.’52 In June 1998, the EU condemned the 
‘wide-spread house-burning and indiscriminate artillery attacks of whole villages 
[indicating] a new level of aggression on the part of the Serbian security forces’ and viewed 
these practices as ‘a new wave of ethnic cleansing.’53 By September 1998, the UN 
Secretary-General concluded that ‘the level of destruction points clearly to an 
indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force against civilian populations.’54 The Serbian 
authorities, who were now perpetrating extreme human rights violations up to and 
including crimes against humanity (ethnic cleansing) crossed the threshold to make the 
international community take action.  
During 1998, the UN Security Council adopted three resolutions, all calling for an ‘enhanced 
status for Kosovo’ a substantially greater degree of autonomy and meaningful self-
determination.’55 Accordingly, US Ambassador Hill was tasked with mediating a political 
solution. The Rambouillet Accords were drafted by 23 February 1998 and provided for 
wide powers of self-government for Kosovo, respecting the territorial integrity of the FRY 
for three years before holding a referendum on status.56 While representatives of the 
Kosovo-Albanians signed the Accords, the FRY and Serbia refused to sign, prompting 
NATO’s military campaign against the FRY on 24 March 1999.57 Although ultimately 
unsuccessful, the Rambouillet Accords set the precedent for diminishing Yugoslav 
sovereignty and building up Kosovo’s sovereignty, reflecting the earned sovereignty 
approach.58  
In the UN Security Council meeting that discussed Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence in 
2008, a number of countries drew on the human rights dimension of the remedial doctrine 
to justify recognizing Kosovo’s independence. The UK attached particular significance to the 
cumulative effect of Belgrade’s actions, explaining that Resolution 1244:  
‘deprived Belgrade of the exercise of authority in Kosovo’ not just because the ‘then regime 
in Belgrade... unilaterally deprived Kosovo of its powers of self-government’ but since it 
‘tried in 1999 to expel the majority population from the territory of Kosovo.’59  
 
                                                            
52 Weller, Contested Statehood, p.66. 
53 Declaration of the EU on Kosovo, (11.June.1998), in Weller, Crisis in Kosovo, p.230  
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55 See: 1998 UNSC/Res. 1160; 1199; 1203   
56Draft ‘Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government In Kosovo Rambouillet’, 23 February 1999. 
   Text at: http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/ramb.htm 
57 Jure Vidmar, ‘International legal responses to Kosovo's declaration of independence’, Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law, Vol. 42 Number 3, 2009, pp.793.  
58 Williams, P. R, ‘Earned Sovereignty: The Road to Resolve the Conflict over Kosovo’s Final Status’, p. 403. 
59 UNSC Meeting-Record, S/PV.5839, 18 February 2008, p.12, UK.  
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The USA described Serbian actions as ‘ethnic cleansing’ and explained that, in response to 
‘that humanitarian disaster and clear threats to international peace and security, NATO led a 
military intervention that stopped the violence and brought peace to Kosovo’.60 From this 
analysis, it seems that, in the immediate post-Cold war period, revoking autonomy and 
pursuing discriminatory policies was not a sufficient cause to remove authority: evidence of 
more extensive suffering and human rights violations was needed to justify intervention 
and de facto secession. 
4.3 The international administration of Kosovo 
Kosovo’s experience of international administration after 1999 is of particular significance 
for analyzing earned sovereignty and remedial secession. Indeed, developments during this 
decade were invoked as fundamental reasons for recognizing Kosovo’s independence. The 
‘earned sovereignty’ approach incorporates three core elements and three optional 
elements, which are drawn from the same set of events, but emphasize different aspects 
of these events  and official documents. For instance, Resolution 1244 (1999) and the 
2001 Constitutional Framework provide the umbrella mandate for ‘shared sovereignty’. 
However, the devolution of sovereignty to the Kosovo authorities was ‘phased’ and made 
conditional on the satisfactory fulfilment of certain benchmarks, whereupon Kosovo’s final 
status could be determined.  In view of the extensive powers vested in the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) under Resolution 1244 and Kosovo’s 
unilateral acceptance of ‘supervised independence’ in February 2008, Kosovo’s institutions 
experience protracted ‘constrained sovereignty’. Following from this analysis it is clear that 
the six elements of earned sovereignty overlap and operate in parallel, making them 
difficult to ‘unbundle’ for analytical purposes. By contrast, remedial secession provides 
limited guidance for such transitional periods, and focuses instead the exhaustion of judicial 
and political methods before secession is deemed a remedy of last resort to redress the 
grievances of an oppressed people. 
4.4 Shared sovereignty  
Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) was the founding document of the post-war 
order in Kosovo. Despite the resolution’s preambular commitment to the territorial integrity 
of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) the ‘operative paragraphs created a situation 
that is not easily reconciled with the principle of territorial integrity.’61 The resolution 
demanded that the FRY end ‘violence and repression in Kosovo’ and withdraw from Kosovo 
‘all military, police and paramilitary forces’.62  The Security Council authorized the 
deployment, under UN auspices, of ‘international civil and security presences’.63 Resolution 
1244 reflects elements of the earned sovereignty approach, by mandating the UN-led civil 
presence with governing the transitional administration and overseeing the development of 
institutions of self-government in Kosovo. The UN was then to devolve sovereign authority 
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and functions to these new institutions and facilitate a political process designed to 
determine Kosovo’s future status, building on the approach of the Rambouillet Accords.64    
The international civil and security presence mandated by Resolution 1244 created the 
structures to implement ‘shared sovereignty’. Accordingly, the UN Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established, which vested supreme authority over 
legislative, executive and judicial bodies in the SRSG. UNMIK was structured according to 
four ‘Pillars’.65 Pillar I dealt with Humanitarian affairs led by UNHCR until 2000, and was 
replaced in 2001 by ‘Law Enforcement and Justice’, under the UN.  Pillar II, civilian 
administration was coordinated by UNMIK. Pillar III, Democratization and Institution-
Building, was administrated by OSCE. The EU was responsible for Pillar IV, mandated with 
economic reconstruction and development. With such a broadly-mandated international 
administration, UNMIK was an unprecedented example of the expanding role of 
international society in state-building by intervention.  
4.5 Institution-building and phased sovereignty 
To facilitate institution-building, Resolution 1244 mandated the civil administration to 
organize and oversee ‘the development of provisional institutions for democratic and 
autonomous self-government’. 66 Reflecting the application of phased sovereignty, UNMIK 
was charged with ‘transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative 
responsibilities while overseeing and supporting the consolidation of Kosovo's local 
provisional institutions and other peace-building activities’.67 In 2001, UNMIK introduced 
the ‘Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government’ which established a 
‘comprehensive legal framework for self-government for Kosovo’.68 The Constitutional 
Framework identified the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) as including: 
the Assembly; the President of Kosovo; the Government; the Courts. The ‘Constitutional 
Framework’ provided that the SRSG should ‘facilitate the transfer of powers and 
responsibilities to the PISG. This gradual process began in 2002 and UNMIK completed the 
transfer of the prescribed PISG responsibilities by the end of 2003.69 Despite international 
reports of progress, for Kosovo-Albanians ‘the period of ineffective and increasingly 
unpopular international administration appeared to stretch on endlessly.’70As Wilde points 
out, UNMIK had been established to solve a governance problem - human rights violations 
under the Milošević regime — but ended up ‘creating a sovereignty problem.’71  
                                                            
64 Ibid. 
65 Kosovo ICJ Written Contribution, April 2009, p. 79. Text available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/search/index.php?p2=2&str=international  
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70 Weller, Contested Statehood, p.185. 
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4.6 Conditional sovereignty and final status negotiations 
Resolution 1244 did not define the future territorial status of Kosovo but rather called for 
a political process leading toward a final settlement. In April 2002, SRSG Michael Steiner 
outlined a series of benchmarks which ‘should be achieved before launching a discussion on 
status.’72 Accordingly, Kosovo provides a detailed example of the linkage between 
conditional sovereignty and final status negotiations and illustrates the problems associated 
with making these aspects coterminous. The benchmarks that formed the basis of the 
‘standards before status’ policy incorporated critical areas such as ‘rule of law, functioning 
democratic institutions, the economy, freedom of movement, the return of internally 
displaced persons and refugees and contributions to regional stability’.73 Following 
consultations with the PISG, UNMIK unveiled the ‘Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan’ in 
March 2004.74 However, it is unclear whether the level of complexity of this 117-page 
document represented ‘conditional sovereignty’ or reflected a ‘delaying tactic’ to avoid 
addressing Kosovo’s status. While Kosovo’s politicians were increasingly frustrated by this 
complex policy, popular frustration with the delayed status rose.  
On 16 March 2004, riots erupted in Kosovo, triggered by the deaths of three Albanian 
boys, reportedly chased into the Mitrovica River by Kosovo-Serbs with dogs.75 Over 
51,000 people participated in 33 separate incidents across Kosovo, resulting in 19 
fatalities (8 Serbs, 11 Albanians).76  The OSCE chronicled 954 people injured, 4,100 people 
displaced, 550 houses and 27 Orthodox churches and monasteries burnt.77 Concerning the 
impact of the March riots on Kosovo’s future status, the earned sovereignty approach 
implies that such behaviour would undermine Kosovo’s claim to deserve full sovereignty. 
Indeed, Belgrade claimed that the riots exposed Kosovo’s unsuitability for statehood.78 In 
response, Albin Kurti, leader of the pro-independence ‘Vetevendosje’ (Self-Determination) 
Movement, commented that ‘Kosovo’s unresolved status is the root cause of the inter-
communal tensions and resultant instability.’79  
Significantly, the 2001 Goldstone Report had warned that the Constitutional Framework 
established an ‘indefinite protectorate’ in which ‘tension between the international 
administration and Kosovar demands for self-determination could easily reach breaking 
point.’80 Facing this scenario, the UN Secretary-General (UNSG) viewed the March riots as 
the failure of UNMIK and commissioned a comprehensive re-evaluation of UN strategy in 
Kosovo. Indeed, two UNMIK officials later commented that violence had ‘advanced the 
independence agenda as nothing else in the previous five years’ leading to a change in how 
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the international community weighed the costs and benefits of maintaining the status 
quo.81 Ambassador Kai Eide prepared two reports to the UNSG, identifying the flaws of the 
complex ‘standard before status’ policy. His second report recommended beginning the 
process for determining Kosovo’s future status.82 Accordingly, the UN Security Council 
authorized the initiation of the future status process and Martti Ahtisaari was appointed as 
UN Special Envoy for Kosovo (UNOSEK) to oversee the process.83 
Although proponents of earned sovereignty identify the Determination of Final Status as a 
core element, their analysis simply observes that the options range from substantial 
autonomy to full independence and that the international community often mediates a 
negotiated settlement, which may be ratified by a referendum.84 By contrast, the remedial 
position emphasizes that secession may only be permitted as a remedy of last resort. 
Accordingly, all judicial and political mechanisms should be exhausted, which in practice 
revolves around the ‘exhaustion of negotiations’. The Future Status negotiations for Kosovo 
occurred in two different phases. First, the Vienna Future Status Negotiations convened 
between February 2006 and March 2007 and Ahtisaari made his recommendation and 
proposal at the end of this phase. When Serbia and Russia called for renewed negotiations, an 
additional round of Troika-led negotiations was held between August and December 2007.  
Following seven months of the Vienna Negotiations, Ahtisaari presented his proposal to the 
two parties in February 2007. Weller explains that ‘Kosovo embraced the proposal in 
principle, offering modest suggestions for amendment.’85 In contrast, Serbian Prime 
Minister Kostunica rejected the agreement and called on Ahtisaari to re-engage in 
negotiations on the basis of the ‘substantive autonomy model’.86 Significantly, the call for 
more discussions was also echoed by the Russian Government.87 Nonetheless, Ahtisaari 
claimed that the threshold had been met, announcing ‘it is my firm view that the potential 
of negotiations is exhausted.’88 Ahtisaari sent his Comprehensive Proposal and a separate 
Recommendation to the UNSG, who fully endorsed both documents and presented them to 
the Security Council on 26 March 2007.89  
Concerning Kosovo’s future status, Ahtisaari recommended ‘independence, supervised 
initially by the international community.’ In justifying his position, Ahtisaari invoked the 
remedial conditions: 
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After years of peaceful resistance to Milošević’s policies of oppression — the revocation of 
Kosovo’s autonomy, the systematic discrimination against the vast Albanian majority in 
Kosovo and their effective elimination from public life — Kosovo-Albanians eventually 
responded with armed resistance. Belgrade’s reinforced and brutal repression followed, 
involving the tragic loss of civilian lives and the displacement and expulsion on a massive 
scale of Kosovo-Albanians from their homes, and from Kosovo. The dramatic deterioration 
of the situation on the ground prompted the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), culminating in the adoption of resolution 1244 (1999)...90 
Ahtisaari also emphasized the cumulative effect of earned sovereignty: 
For the past eight years, Kosovo and Serbia have been governed in complete separation... 
[UNMIK’s] assumption of all legislative, executive and judicial authority throughout Kosovo, 
has created a situation in which Serbia has not exercised any governing authority over 
Kosovo...91 
 
In his recommendation, Ahtisaari applied both the earned sovereignty and remedial 
secession approaches to justify a move away from the UN deference to the territorial 
integrity of its member states. In his Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status 
Settlement (CSS), Ahtisaari outlined prescriptions for Kosovo’s future status, including 
constitutional, economic and security provisions. Ahtisaari’s CSS also described the 
supervisory role envisaged for the international presence, ultimately providing that all 
‘authority vested in UNMIK shall be transferred en bloc to the authorities of Kosovo’.92 
However, Ahtisaari’s CSS met a divided response. While the EU and the US lobbied the 
Security Council in favour of a draft resolution to endorse the Ahtisaari package, Serbia and 
Russia insisted on holding a new round of negotiations, highlighting the difficulty of 
establishing a threshold for the exhaustion of negotiations 
Between August and December 2007, a mediating Troika of senior diplomats from Russia, 
the US and the EU held a new round of status talks. In total, the Troika held ten negotiation 
sessions, including a final, intensive three-day conference. Serbia took full advantage of the 
opportunity to start negotiations afresh and put forward a series of concrete suggestions 
for autonomy, offering Kosovo ‘most competencies and symbols that are normally reserved 
only for sovereign countries’.93 Kosovo re-iterated its demands for independence, having 
negotiated Ahtisaari’s CSS in good faith in the belief that it was the definitive settlement’.94 
On 7 December, the Troika sent its report to the Secretary-General stating that ‘both 
parties were fully engaged’ but that ‘neither side was willing to cede its position on the 
basic question of sovereignty.’95 Emerging from a UN Security Council meeting on the 
Troika report the United States and certain EU states issued a joint statement ‘that the 
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potential for a negotiated solution is now exhausted.’96 Media reports suggested that the 
EU and the United States had decided to implement the Ahtisaari Plan without a Security 
Council resolution and forecast Kosovo’s imminent unilateral declaration of independence.97 
4.7 Constrained sovereignty in an independent Kosovo 
Convened in an extraordinary meeting on 17 February 2008, Kosovo elected representatives 
met and adopted a Declaration of Independence. The authors of the Declaration proclaimed 
Kosovo as ‘an independent and sovereign state’ and undertook to cooperate fully with 
[international] presences’, to accept fully Ahtisaari’s CSS.98 As identified by the earned 
sovereignty approach, constrained sovereignty involves continued limitation of the sovereign 
authority and functions of the new state, such as continued international administrative 
and/or military presence.99 The new international presence reflects this approach as it was 
established to supervise Kosovo’s independence and support weak governance sectors, 
namely justice and security. The International Civilian Office (ICO) supervises the 
implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, decentralization, cultural and religious heritage, and 
community affairs.100 Meanwhile, the EU Rule of Law mission (EULEX) is tasked to mentor, 
monitor and assist the consolidation of Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law 
enforcement agencies while strengthening an independent multi-ethnic justice system and 
multi-ethnic police and customs service.101 In the military sphere, the NATO-led Kosovo 
Force (KFOR) continues to provide overall security services for Kosovo. 
However, this period of constrained sovereignty is complicated by the unfinished mission of 
UNMIK and the new international presence, which is divided between organizations that are 
status supportive (ICO) and status-neutral (UNMIK, OSCE and EULEX). Indeed, the UNSG 
acknowledged that, ‘UNMIK has been confronted with a substantially changed situation in 
Kosovo and has faced fundamental challenges to its authority and role.’102 Accordingly, the 
‘conflicting positions’ of multiple international organizations constrain Kosovo’s exercise of 
sovereign authorities and functions in the sectors of justice and rule of law and in North 
Kosovo, where UNMIK and OSCE facilitate the continuation of Serbian parallel structures. 
V. Justifications invoked by states recognizing Kosovo  
To date, Kosovo has been recognized by 70 out of 192 UN Member States (37%). 
Recognition statistics show that most of recognitions come from member states of 
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Western multilateral and regional political, economic and security organizations.103 For 
instance, Kosovo is recognized by 22 out of 27 European Union Member States (82%). 
Meanwhile, 85% of NATO Member States 70% of Council of Europe Member States and 
63% of OSCE Member States have recognized Kosovo’s independence. Despite the general 
expectation that most Arab states would recognize Kosovo, only 17 out of 57 Member 
States of the Organization of Islamic Conference and only 8 out of 22 Arab League 
Member States conferred recognition.  
Of significance for the foregoing theoretical analysis, most countries that recognize Kosovo 
justify their response by invoking elements incorporated by remedial secession and earned 
sovereignty. However, a significant number invoke regional peace and stability, which is not 
directly covered by these two theoretical perspectives. Considering that some states do 
not make their statements public and that certain countries provide only a factual 
recognition without any justification, forty statements provide sufficient information for 
analysis. Based on a thematic analysis of these statements, the table on the following page 
was complied to illustrate the explicit invocation of particular conditions. 
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Conditions invoked by countries that recognize Kosovo’s independence 
 
 
Costa Rica provides the clearest articulation of the remedial secession doctrine, 
understanding that ‘after the crimes against humanity (ethnic cleansing) perpetrated by the 
regime of Slobodan Milošević, the decision of the authorities and of people of Kosovo not 
to remain part of the Republic of Serbia is explicable’. Costa rica also acknowledged that the 
‘possibilities of reaching a negotiated solution between the Belgrade and Pristina authorities 
have been exhausted’ and congratulated ‘the authorities and inhabitants of the Republic of 
Kosovo for their success in building a democratic and peaceful independent Kosovo.’104 
                                                            










The right to self-determination in 






Albania, Slovenia, Burkina Faso, San Marino, and 
United Arab Emirates 
The will of people (majority) 
 
5 Costa Rica, Afghanistan, Australia, Ireland, and 
Saudi Arabia 
 
The human rights abuses 
 
5 Australia, Ireland, Costa Rica, Canada,  and Samoa 
 
The international humanitarian 
intervention and administration  
 
9 Austria, Peru, Ireland, Switzerland, Sweden, 
Canada, Burkina Faso, and Malta 
Exhaustion of final status 
negotiations   
13 Luxemburg, Austria, Ireland, Costa Rica, Peru, 
Iceland, Croatia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Canada, and Malta 
 
Statehood  capacities 9 USA, Turkey, Costa Rico, Canada, Norway,  Burkina 
Faso, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Dominican 
Republic  
 
Acceptance of ‘Supervised 
Independence’ and Ahtisaari 
Proposal  
17 USA, Estonia, Italy, Luxemburg, Switzerland, 
Ireland, Sweden, Finland, Japan, Canada, Hungary, 
Croatia, Norway, and San Marino, Sierra Leone, 
and Costa Rica 
 
Regional peace and security 25 USA, France, Albania, Turkey, Australia, Senegal, 
Luxemburg, Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Japan, 
Finland, Canada, Hungary, Croatia, Bulgaria, Korea, 
Burkina Faso, San Marino, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Saudi Arabia, Lithuania, Samoa, 
Dominican Republic and  Costa Rica 
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Similarly, Ireland acknowledged that: the legacy of the conflict of the late 1990s made the 
return of Serb dominion in Kosovo unthinkable, and also undermined the prospects for a 
long-sought compromise.’ 105  
However, only three other countries explicitly noted human rights abuses, suggesting that 
this is not that dominant international consideration. By contrast, seventeen countries 
made explicit reference to the exhaustion of negotiations, indicating a broad support base 
for independence as a remedy of last resort. Of significance, Montenegro and Macedonia 
issued a common statement acknowledging that ‘the declaration of independence of 
Kosovo came after the failure of the international community efforts for Belgrade and 
Pristina negotiations to result in solution for Kosovo status.’106 However, it is questionable 
whether the emphasis on the exhaustion of negotiations was more concerned with 
establishing a last resort for remedial secession, or for promoting regional stability and 
development. Hungary stated:   
It has become clear that the status quo in Kosovo was unsustainable and moving forward in 
the settlement was necessary for the lasting stability and development of the region. It has 
also become evident that there was no optimal solution acceptable to both sides, and the 
potential for further negotiations had been exhausted.107  
Significantly, twenty-five recognition statements justified Kosovo’s independence as crucial 
for regional peace and stability in the Balkans, reflecting a variety of geostrategic 
perspectives and the primary concern to contain the threat posed to international peace 
and security by protracted sovereignty-disputes and contested territories. Since European 
countries bemoan the ‘migration burden’ of the Balkan conflicts, it is not surprising that 
Switzerland states that the ‘clarification of the status of Kosovo is a precondition for the 
stability as well as for the economic and political development of the whole of the Western 
Balkans.’108 Reflecting the security concerns of the Islamic world, Saudi Arabia hoped that 
recognizing Kosovo would ‘positively contribute to enhancing the pillars of security and 
stability in Kosovo and its neighbouring countries.’109 Asian countries also advocated the 
promotion of peace and stability in the Balkans, with Korea expecting that ‘Kosovo's 
independence will contribute to promoting to the peace and stability of the region as well 
as its democratic development and economic recovery.’110  
Twenty-three countries acknowledged elements of ‘earned sovereignty’, which include 
international administration, the successful development of statehood capacities (reflecting 
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the Montevideo criteria for statehood) and Kosovo’s acceptance of ‘supervised 
independence’ and the stipulations of the Ahtisaari Proposal regarding respect for minority 
rights and cultural heritage. The recognition statement of the USA articulated these 
elements most clearly explaining how Kosovo has  
‘worked to rebuild its war-shattered society, establish democratic institutions, hold 
successful elections for a new government, and foster prosperity. As an independent state, 
Kosovo now assumes responsibility for its destiny.... in its declaration of independence, 
Kosovo has willingly assumed the responsibilities assigned to it under the Ahtisaari Plan. The 
United States welcomes this unconditional commitment to carry out these responsibilities 
and Kosovo's willingness to cooperate fully with the international community during the 
period of international supervision to which you have agreed.111  
Canada also echoed the elements of earned sovereignty but emphasized that:  
Kosovo is a unique case, as illustrated by its recent history characterized by war and ethnic 
cleansing, the role subsequently played by the United Nations and NATO in administering 
the territory and providing for its security, and the ongoing role that international 
organizations such as the European Union will play in assisting Kosovo with its transition to 
full independence.... We welcome the commitment made by Kosovo to ensure the 
protection of the rights of Serbian and other minorities, including their right to safety [and] 
welcomes Kosovo's commitment to ensure the protection of religious and cultural heritage 
sites.112  
This analysis of the invocation of remedial secession and earned sovereignty in the context 
of Kosovo reflects a normative shift towards making state sovereignty conditional on 
respect for human rights.113 The shift from ‘sovereignty as authority over territory’ towards 
‘sovereignty as responsibility’ gives rise to three concepts that are closely related. The first 
- humanitarian intervention - empowers external actors to intervene in the state and to 
prevent human rights abuses. The second – remedial secession – could empower an 
oppressed people to claim secession as a remedy of last resort. The third - earned 
sovereignty - empowers the international community to supervise and recognize 
independence, provided that the new state complies with democratic and human rights 
norms. 
VI. In lieu of a conclusion: Towards remedial sovereignty? 
The foregoing analysis confirms that the doctrines of remedial secession and earned 
sovereignty possess explanatory power for the different phases of the Kosovo issue. 
Remedial secession provides a theoretical framework for evaluating the root causes of the 
governance and sovereignty problems emanating from the abolition of autonomy and gross 
violations of human rights, culminating in ethnic cleansing. However, remedial secession 
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provides limited guidance in resolving the problems it so accurately predicts. This ‘gap’ is 
addressed by earned sovereignty, which identifies six elements for analysis. Although they 
overlap, a cautious application of these elements to Kosovo facilitates a comprehensive 
analysis of the different phases and shifting focus of the international administration of 
Kosovo, including supervised independence. Our analysis of the recognition statements 
confirms that elements of remedial secession and earned sovereignty were considered and 
invoked by the international community. However, it is significant that the most frequently 
invoked condition – the promotion of regional stability – is not incorporated into either 
theory.  
Accordingly, the causal factors, development and conclusion of Kosovo’s path towards 
‘recognizable’ independence can be explained more accurately by what we describe as 
‘remedial sovereignty’. Remedial sovereignty is a process by which an oppressed people 
realise statehood by invoking remedial secession and undergoing a transitional period of 
mediated international administration, characterized by elements of sovereignty which are 
externally-designed and internally-earned. Externally-designed sovereignty relates to the 
set of actions and norms imposed by the international administration in order to create the 
political, economic and social infrastructure whereby the entity consolidates its statehood 
capacities with functioning democratic institutions, a self-reliant market economy, the 
capacity to make and implement law and contribute to regional stability. Meanwhile 
internally-earned sovereignty refers to the efforts of people within the entity to comply 
with all conditionality mechanisms to achieve the above described statehood capacities and 
to engage in good faith with final status negotiations.  
Both remedial secession and earned sovereignty exhibit certain weaknesses that can be 
overcome by our approach of ‘remedial sovereignty’. Russia’s invocation of remedial 
secession to justify its recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 illustrated the 
risk that the doctrine can be abused by states who wish to weaken an opponent or, in 
extreme cases, incorporate the territory of a neighbouring state. Similarly, the current 
formulation of earned sovereignty does not limit its application to only the most severe 
cases. Accordingly, there is a risk that regions which acquire powers via decentralization or 
enhanced autonomy within functioning democracies may claim that they have ‘earned’ a 
right to exercise their sovereignty externally. By emphasizing the vital link between these 
two doctrines, we limit the potential for abuse and territorial fragmentation to cases when 
internationally-supervised sovereignty is granted only as a remedy of last resort to address 
gross violations of human rights. However, it is important that this new approach is subject 
to rigorous procedural review as the risks of protracted governance are just as serious as 
the risks of premature exit. 
Since our observations about remedial secession and earned sovereignty are mainly 
generated from the Kosovo case, the analysis could be challenged by arguments that 
Kosovo is a ‘unique case’. Indeed, most supporters of Kosovo’s independence insist that 
Kosovo is a unique case. Coppetiers points out that this use of the term ‘unique’, rather 
23 
 
than an exception, has significant implications.114 Whereas unique cases do not refer to 
general principles, exceptions do and can constitute a precedent for such principles.115 By 
invoking a sui generis case, states claim that the Kosovo falls outside the general normative 
framework and cannot be guided by existing principles. In contrast, Russia insists that ‘any 
speculation about the uniqueness of the Kosovo case is just an attempt to circumvent legal 
rules.’116 Countries with internal separatist problems, such as China, Russia and Spain are 
extremely unwilling to recognize a situation which may exacerbate their own problems. 
Fear of the Kosovo precedent was heightened by Russia’s controversial recognition of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008, leading to a ‘recognition dilemma’. Remedial 
sovereignty challenges the weaknesses of the remedial secession and earned sovereignty 
approaches and views support for Kosovo’s independence as arising from the fulfilment of 
the relevant conditions. It remains to be seen whether other cases can fulfil the same 
conditions.  
                                                            
114 Bruno Coppieters, ‘Kosovo and the Principles of Just Secession’, CEPS Policy Brief No 147, November 2007, 
p. 3. Text available at: http://www.ceps.eu/book/what-just-secession-kosovo-unique.  
115 Ibid, p.3 
116 Weller, Contested Statehood, p.113. 
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